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REGULATING VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS:
IS THE INVISIBLE HAND PICKING THE POCKETS
OF THE TERMINALLY ILL?
Russell J. Herron*
The newly emerging viatical settlement industry has attracted
considerable attention from both insurance regulators and advocates for the terminally ill. In a viatical settlement, a terminally ill
person names a viatical settlement company as beneficiary under
his life insurance policy in exchange for an immediate lump-sum
cash payment of less than face value of the policy. To date, viatical
settlement payments to people with AIDS (PWAs) have been disturbingly low as a percentage of the face value of PWA policies.
This Note examines the few enacted viatical settlement regulations
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' model
regulations as they particularly relate to PWAs). Acknowledging the
importance of viatical settlements as a source of income for financially-strapped PWAs, this Note argues for a regulatory scheme in
which PWAs receive greater protections and higher payouts than
they receive in the current unregulated market, while still allowing
viatical companies a reasonable return commensurate with the
actual risks and costs of the viatical business. Part I argues that
consumer protection rationales justify licensing and disclosure
regulations. Part II explores controversial proposals for minimum
payout regulations of viatical settlement providers, and concludes
that such regulations, if carefully crafted, are warranted. Finally,
Part III examines the advent of accelerated benefits provisions in
life insurance policies as alternatives to viatical settlements.

INTRODUCTION

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) often renders
its victims unable to work at a time when they most need a
steady income. A recent estimate places the average medical
cost of AIDS treatment, from full-blown AIDS to death, at

*
Executive Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 28,
1995. B.A. 1991, University of Michigan; J.D. 1995, University of Michigan Law
School. I am grateful to Professor David L. Chambers of the University of Michigan
Law School for his thoughtful comments and guidance throughout the writing of this
Note.
931

932

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 28:4

$69,100 per patient. 1 Such a bill can easily bankrupt even
those people with AIDS (PWAs) who are able to continue to
work until the last few months before death. As a result, many
PWAs not only face premature death; many also must face
death in poverty. Mounting bills can exact a heavy psychological toll on PWAs at a time when they need peace of mind. As
one advocate for PWAs noted, "There is no dignity in facing the
last days of one's life as part of the indigent poor."2 In fact, if
financial worries contribute to depression, they may even
hasten death. 3
A 1992 survey distributed to 30,000 PWAs and HIV-positive
individuals confirmed the extent of the financial need ofPWAs. 4
The National Association of People with AIDS (NAPWA) found
that over 50% of respondents had difficulty paying for medicine,
clothing, transportation, housing, and food. 5 Almost 30% reported living on less than $500 per month, while another 30%
struggled to get by on between $500 and $1000 per month. 6
NAPWA also estimated that as many as 50% of PWAs own life
insurance. 7 Although many of the survey's financially needy
individuals probably also lack life insurance, NAPWA's survey
suggests that techniques which would allow PWAs to obtain
money from their life insurance policies could benefit a substantial number of PWAs.

1.
Lifetime AIDS Treatment Cost Set at $119,274 by U.S. Agency, AIDS POL'v &
L., Aug. 6, 1993, at 3. For a detailed discussion of the costs of AIDS treatment, see Lee
Ann Dean, Note, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Viatical Settlement, and the
Health Care Crisis: AIDS Patients Reach Into the Future to Make Ends Meet, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 117, 122-27 (1993).
2.
Life Insurance (A) Committee, lB NAT'L AsS'N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS PROC.
779, 787 (1993) (statement of William J. Freeman, Executive Director, National
Association of People with AIDS, Dec. 7, 1992) [hereinafter Freeman Statement].
3.
See Depression May Accelerate HN Disease Progression, AIDS ALERT, Sept.
1992, at 140 (reporting the results of a study finding that "depression accelerates
declines in CD4 counts among HIV-infected people, and therefore, may hasten disease
progression and death"). For a discussion of the role ofCD-4 cell counts in predicting
life expectancies, see infra Part 11.B.1.
4.
See Freeman Statement, supra note 2, at 786.
5.
Id. at 787. Because almost 80% of the surveys respondents were white, id.,
the survey probably understates the financial difficulties of PWAs by under representing African-American and Latino populations-groups disproportionately affected by
unemployment and poverty.
6.
Freeman Statement, supra note 2, at 787.
7.
Id.
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One such technique, the "viatical settlement,"8 was developed
in the late 1980s as a response to the financial needs of PWAs
and other terminally ill people. In a viatical settlement, a
terminally ill policyholder (the viator) assigns the death benefit
of his policy to a viatical settlement provider9 (the company),
in exchange for an immediate payment ofless than the expected death benefit of the policy. 10 By the terms of the agreement,
the entire death benefit is paid to the viatical settlement
provider upon the viator's death. Although viatical settlements
theoretically could be available to anyone with a dramatically
shortened life expectancy, the vast majority ofviatical settlements have been undertaken by PWAs, with terminal cancer
patients comprising much of the remainder. 11
From the viator's perspective, the viatical transaction itself
is fairly simple. The applicant contacts as many viatical
settlement providers as he wishes and fills out detailed application forms, typically consisting of a questionnaire, 12 an

8.
The term "viatical" comes from the Latin word "viaticum," which means both
the Eucharist "administered to a person near or in danger of death," and "[a) supply
or official allowance of money for a journey." 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 3572 (1993).
,
9.
A viatical settlement provider should be distinguished from a viatical
settlement broker. Viatical settlement providers enter into the actual viatical
agreements themselves, purchasing from the viator the right to become the irrevocable
beneficiary under his policy. VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2(0) (Nat'l Ass'n
oflns. Comm'rs 1994) [hereinafter VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT). In contrast,
viatical brokers offer to find viatical settlements for a fee or otherwise introduce or
act as intermediaries between viators and viatical settlement providers. Id. § 2(B).
This Note focuses solely on viatical settlement providers, and the generic term "company" refers to a viatical settlement provider.
10. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) defines "viatical
settlement contract" in the VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 2(C).
The NAIC's definition is broader than the one I have given, but not in a way that is
relevant to this Note.
11. This Note focuses on PWAs because they constitute the bulk ofviatical consumers. See Michael Quint, Pre-Death Cash: A Business Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
1994, at Dl, D2 (noting that terminal cancer patients currently make up only 10%
of viators). Most of the discussion that follows will focus on issues of particular
relevance to PWAs, although many of the conclusions reached apply equally to other
via tors.
12. For example, the questionnaire of Life Benefactors, L.P., a California viatical
provider, requests information about the applicant's current employment, receipt of
means-based government assistance, family relationships, medical history, and life
insurance policy. See Life Benefactors, L.P., Questionnaire 1-4 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The medical history questions focus
on the applicant's CD-4 cell count, the names of his treating hospitals and physicians,
and the types of treatment he has been receiving for his condition. Id.
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authorization to release medical records, 13 and an authorization to release insurance policy information. Once the viatical.
provider has received all of the information, its panel of physicians evaluates the applicant's records and renders an opinion
to the provider as to the applicant's prognosis. 14 If the provider
finds that the applicant has a sound insurance policy and, in
consultation with its physicians, finds that the applicant has
a qualifying condition that results in a life expectancy of less
than two years, the provider then calculates a purchase price.
and makes an offer . to the applicant. 15 The offer typically
amounts to between fifty and eighty percent of the policy's face
value. 16 If the applicant accepts the offer, the provider and
applicant (now aviator) sign the purchase documents, which
include a purch~se agreement for the policy, a change of
ownership form, and a change of beneficiary form. 17 The latter
two forms then are forwarded to the viator's life insurance
company, which records the information, files the documents,
and sends a confirmation to the viator. Once the viatical
provider receives confirmation of the changes; it pays the
viator, in a lump sum, the full amount of the viatical settlement, either by cashier's check or wire transfer. 18 The entire
process can be completed in three to six weeks. 19
The viatical business first emerged in 1988,20 and in a
relatively short period of time the number of viatical settle-:
ment companies has grown to approximately fifty-eight in
1994. Of these fifty-eight companies, over half are located in
California, New York, Florida, and Texas. 21 These fifty-eight
13. The medical records release used by Life Benefactors includes within its scope
"all past, present, or future medical information or knowledge of medical information,
medical reports, physical examination reports, hospital reports, laboratory reports,
options concerning [the applicant's] health, or X-ray reports relating to [the applicant]
or [his) health." Id. at 7.
14. For a discussion of the difficulties of predicting PWA life expectancies, see
infra Part 11.B.l.
·
15. See LIFE BENEFACTORS, L.P., MOST OFTEN AsKED QUESTIONS AND THEIR
ANSWERS [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS] (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
16. See, e.g., Jennifer Berner, Note, Beating the Grim Reaper, or Just Confusing
Him? Examining the Harmful Effects of Viatical Settlement Regulation, 27 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 581, 584 (1994) (noting that "(a] purchaser usually pays aviator
fifty to eighty percent of the policy's value").
17. See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20.
Quint, supra note 11, at D2.
21. AB of March 13, 1995, California had 12 viatical companies, New York had
7, and Texas and Florida each had 6 companies. Viatical Set~lement Firms (unpub-
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companies purchased approximately $300 million worth oflife
insurance policies, or nearly 4000 policies, in 1994. 22 Most
companies are quite small, having the capacity to purchase
only five to ten million dollars in policies. 23 The exception, and
probably the leader of a trend toward larger providers, is
Chicago-based Viaticus, which expects to purchase up to $500
million in policies within the next five years. 24
This rapidly growing industry has come under increasing
scrutiny by state insurance regulators and legislators, largely
because of the high profits that viatical settlement companies
have been earning, which some regulators see as a sign of
abuse. 25 Neither proponents nor opponents of regulation
seriously dispute the existence of better-than-average profits
for viatical companies, although both groups have their own
motives for acknowledging high returns. Critics· of viatical
settlements rail against such profits in their attacks on the
industry, while viatical companies trumpet unusually large
returns in their investment promotional materials. Both groups
have obvious incentives to overstate profit margins. The
estimate of average profits most frequently cited in news
reports places them at nearly twenty percent of the face value
of the policy, with profits on individual viatical settlements
sometimes exceeding forty percent. 26 These returns, coupled
with the fact that, at first glance, viatical settlements seem to

lished list supplied by the National Association of People With AIDS) (on file with the
Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (tabulations by the author).
22. Quint, supra note 11, at D2.
23. Id.
24.. Id.
25. The Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the position that the way
some companies sell viatical settlements to investors renders them " 'investment
contract' securities," which require registration under the Securities Act of 1933. See
SEC Files Fraud, Registration Claims Based on Sale ofDeath Benefit Interests, 26 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1203, 1203 (1994). At least one commentator has disagreed with
the SEC's conclusion. See Shanah D. Glick, Comment, Are Viatical Settlements Securi·
ties Within the Regulatory Control of the Securities Act of 1933?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
957, 958 (1993) (concluding that "whether brokered or nonbrokered, viatical settlements are not securities and therefore are not subject to the regulatory control of the
'33 Act").
26. See Berner, supra note 16, at 585; Quint, supra note 11, at D2. But see
Melinda Fulmer, •Knocking on Heauen's Door": ALI Offers Financial Security to the
Dying, SAN ANTONIO Bus. J., June 24, 1994, § 1, at 1 (stating that the "return on a
viatical investment can be as high as 14 percent").
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be a "ghoulish business,"27 have lead ten states to enact legislation regulating the viatical settlement industry2 8 and several
more to consider it. 29
As states seek the proper regulatory stance, disagreement
has grown over the degree of regulation warranted. This Note,
in contrast to other commentators who have concluded that
much of viatical settlement regulation is a bad idea, 30 applies
a rigorous analysis to existing and proposed viatical settlement
regulations, concluding that those _few states that currently
regulate viatical settlements should adopt minimum payout
regulations and that those states that have no viatical regula.tions in place would be well-served to adopt the regulatory
scheme discussed. Part I argues that consumer protection
rationales justify current licensing and disclosure regulations
in the few states that have them. Part II explores the controversial proposals for minimum payout regulations of viatical
settlement providers and concludes that such regulations, if
carefully crafted, are warranted. Finally, Part III examines an
alternative to viatical settlements-accelerated benefits provisions in life insurance policies-and concludes that accelerated
benefits, while often preferable to viatication, do not signal the
eventual obsolescence of viatical settlements.
Two important points must be noted before examining regulations aimed at informational inequalities in viatical markets.
First, one of the unsettling aspects of the viatical settlement
industry is that discussing viatical settlements in terms of profit
and risk necessarily dehumanizes the PWAs involved in these
transactions. What viatical settlement providers consider to be
"risks," PWAs see as sources of great hope-that they will live

27.
Quint, supra note 11, at Dl.
28. Those ten states include the following: California, CAL. INS. CODE§§ 10113.1-.2
(West 1993); Louisiana, 1995 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1976 (West); Minnesota, 1995 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 270 (West); New York, N.Y. INS. LAW§§ 7801-7810 (McKinney Supp.
1995); North Carolina, 1995 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 615; North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 26.1-33.1 (1995); Oregon, 1995 Or. Laws Ch. 342; Texas, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4672 (Vernon) (amending TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.50-6A (West Supp. 1995)); Vermont,
VT. STAT. ANN tit. 8, §§ 3826-3834 (Supp. 1995); and Washington, 1995 Wash. Legis.
Serv. 403 (West).
29.
For example, two bills were proposed in the Florida legislature but died in
committee. S. 1688, Reg. Sess. (1995); H.R. 1207, Reg. Seas. (1995). There is pending
legislation in Illinois. H.R. 1796, 89th Gen. Assembly (1995) (as amended), and in
Pennsylvania, H. 1551 (1995). The Missouri Senate proposed legislation that ultimately
died in committee. S. 184, 88th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1995). The list of states
with proposed legislation is a growing one.
30. See, e.g., Berner, supra note 16, at 582; Dean, supra note 1, at 122.
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longer than their doctors' predictions and that a cure for AIDS ·
will be found. In the language of the viatical settlement
industry, viatical settlements "mature" when the PWA dies,
and the sooner the PWA dies, the greater the viatical
company's profit. This Note attempts to emphasize the
humanity of the viator as often as possible-something the
language of the industry often makes difficult to do.
Second, it is important at the outset to recognize the limitations ofviatical settlements, and of other life insurance-based
approaches, as solutions to the financial problems of PWAs.
Such approaches are available only for those who own life
insurance and thus are unavailable to those PWAs with the
most dire financial need-America's urban poor and the great
majority of intravenous drug users. Viatical settlements are
undoubtedly an important development in meeting the financial needs of the large number of PWAs who are fortunate
enough to own life insurance, but they are by no means a
financial panacea for all PWAs.
I. CORRECTING INFORMATIONAL INEQUALITIES:
THE CASE FOR DISCLOSURE

The bulk of current state regulation of viatical settlements
focuses on providing potential viators with enough information
to make an informed choice to viaticate. 31 Such regulation has
faced little resistance, with even the most laissez-faire industry
group proclaiming that it "encourages viators to become informed."32 This lack of resistance may result from the fact that
"information policies 'do not necessarily impose great costs on
concentrated interests such as individual producers."'33 This
Part examines the major information disclosure requirements
of existing state regulation, as well as the model regulation of
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC),
and concludes that all these requirements can be justified as
reasonable consumer protection measures and should therefore
be adopted in more states.

31.

See infra Part l.B.

32.
NATIONAL VIATICAL Ass'N, INFORMATION BOOKLET 6 (1994) [hereinafter NVA
INFORMATION BOOKLET] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law

Reform).
33. IAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER PROTECTION TEXT AND MATERIALS 70 (1989).
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Unequal information is recognized as a justification for
limited market regulation. In consumer markets similar to the
viatical settlement market, "information gaps between buyer
and seller" can be a source of market failure, because "markets
need adequate information on prices, quality and terms if they
are to function efficiently."34 As a result, the absence of equal
information "may create a role for regulation of market transactions. "35
When asymmetric information exists within a consumer
market,
information remedies [as opposed to direct regulation of
terms] will usually be the preferable solution. Remedies
which simply adjust the information available to consumers
still leave consumers free to make their own choices, thus
introducing less rigidity into the market. Such remedies
leave the market free to respond as consumer preferences
and production technologies change over time. 36
This asymmetry may result from the fact that consumer
information is a public good, and the provider of the information will have a difficult time preventing non-paying customers
from gaining access to it. 37 "This suggests that in consumer
markets there will be an underprovision of information and a
shortage of fully informed consumers."38 Viatical companies
have some incentive to provide viators with information,
because doing so may distinguish one company from its competitors. 39 For example, member companies of the National
Viatical Association (NVA) attempt to gain a competitive
advantage by agreeing to uphold a "Code of Ethics" and list of
"Standard Business Practices" which require that signatories
provide certain information to potential viators. 40 Notwithstanding such efforts, "[t]he public good characteristics of

34. Id. at 36-37.
35. DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 62 (1989).
36. Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24
J.L. & ECON. 491, 513 (1981).
37. RAMSAY, supra note 33, at 42.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. NVA INFORMATION BOOKLET, supra note 32, at 15-16. The NVA's Standard
Business Practices require member companies to disclose the effects of viatical
settlements on government benefits, tax implications ofviatication, and accelerated
benefits options. Id. at 15.
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information might provide a prima facie rationale for government subsidisation of the provision of consumer information. "41
In seeking to provide information to consumers, however, the
proper goal should not be perfect information, which would be
too costly to provide, but rather adequate information. 42 Justifying the disclosure requirements of viatical legislation thus
depends on whether or not PWAs possess inadequate information, either because the present market does not provide it or
because what information the market does provide is so
complex that viators have difficulty understanding it. 43 The
former reason is more relevant here, because viatical settlements are, at least from the viator's perspective, a fairly
straight-forward transaction. 44
Three remedies may address the informational inequalities
in· the viatical market: (1) removing existing restraints on
information; (2) correcting misleading information; and (3)
requiring additional information. 45 Only the latter two remedies are of importance, because there are no substantial restraints on information in viatical markets. Because existing
and model regulations make effective use of these remedies,
more states should adopt similar requirements.
A. Correcting Misleading Information

In an effort to prevent viatical companies from disseminating
misleading information, the NAIC's Model Regulation (Model
Regulation) of viatical settlement advertising provides that
viatical advertisements "should be truthful and not misleading
by fact or implication."46 In addition, the regulations require
that advertisements which "emphasize[] the speed with which
.the viatication will occur ... must disclose the average time
frame from completed application to the date of offer and from
acceptance of the offer to receipt of the funds by the viator."47
41.
RAMSAY, supra note 33, at 42.
42.
Id. at 41.
43.
Id. at 41-42.
44.
For a discussion of the factors which make overreaching byviatical companies
possible, see infra Part 11.D.
45. See Beales et al., supra note 36, at 514.
46.
VIATICAL SE'ITLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION § 6(H)(l) (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs 1994) [hereinafter VIATICAL SE'ITLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION).
47.
Id. § 6(H)(2).

940

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 28:4

This regulation is aimed at early viatical providers who
claimed to make cash immediately available. The Model
Regulation further provides that "[i]fthe advertising emphasizes the dollar amounts available to viators, the advertising shall
disclose the average purchase price as a percent of face value
obtained by viators contracting with the advertiser during the
past six (6) months."48 These provisions are justifiable efforts
to correct misleading information through the provision of
additional information to viators-information which will allow
PWAs to make more informed decisions to viaticate.

B. Requiring Additional Information
Imperfect consumer information can result in a "misallocation of consumer resources."49 Ifviators do not have information about alternatives to viatical settlements, they may
viaticate when doing so will not maximize the value of their
insurance policies. To ensure that viatication is the best option
for the PWA, all ten existing state laws 50 and the NAIC's Model
Act (Model Act) require that the viatical company inform the
applicant of "alternatives to viatical settlement contracts ...
including, but not limited to, accelerated benefits."51 The Model
Act and existing state laws also require that viatical companies
inform the applicant of the tax treatment of the viatical settlement.52 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a private
letter ruling in 1994 stating that amounts received from
viatical settlements must be included as part of taxable income.53 Part of the Republican "Contract with America," the

48.
Id. § 6(H)(3).
49.
RAMSAY, supra note 33, at 42-43.
50. See supra note 28.
51. E.g., VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 8(A); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10113.2(d)(l) (West 1993); N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807(b)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1995); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(1) (Supp. 1995). For a discussion of accelerated benefits as
an alternative to viatical settlement, see infra Part III.
52. E.g., VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 8(B); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10113.2(d)(2); N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807(b)(3); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(2).
53.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020 (July 22, 1994). The IRS determined that the settlement amount received by the viator is taxable to the extent that it exceeds his
adjusted basis in the insurance contract. Id.; see also Darlene Chandler, IRS Letter
on Taxation of Policy Sold to Viatical Co., NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Feb. 20, 1995, at 22
(discussing Private Letter Ruling 94-43-020).
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Contract with America Tax Relief Act of 1995,54 would amend
the Internal Revenue Code to exempt from taxation both
viatical settlements and accelerated benefits by terminally ill
people, 55 who are defined as those with life expectancies of
twenty-four months or less. 56 The bill was passed by the House
of Representatives and awaits action in the Senate. 57
Viatical companies also must inform applicants of viatication's "consequences for interruption of public assistance." 58
Money received from a viatical settlement counts as income
and will result in an interruption of means-based government
benefits, including Medicaid, food stamps, and Supplementary
Security Income (SSI). 59 The mere possibility of viatication,
however, generally does not count as a source of income to
which government agencies can require a person applying for
assistance to turn. 60 Similarly, New York law provides that
health care facilities and practitioners cannot "coerce or require
54.
H.R. 1215, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
55. Id.§ 221; see also 'Contract' Contains Viaticals Clause, INS. REGULATOR, Jan.
16, 1995, at 8 (discussing the Senior Citizens' Equity Act, which would provide
favorable tax treatment of accelerated death benefits).
56.
H.R. 1215, supra note 54, § 221(a).
57.
2 Cong. Index. (CCH) 35,016 (Sept. 1, 1995).
58. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE§ 10113.2(d)(3); N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807(b)(4); see also
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(4); VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, §
8(B). The Viatical Settlements Model Act and the Vermont statute are not as vague
as the California and New York statutes. Compare VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL
ACT, supra note 9, § 8(0) (requiring that the applicant be informed of"[t)he fact that
receipt of a viatical settlement may adversely effect [sic] the recipient's eligibility for
Medicaid or other government benefits or entitlements and that advice should be
obtained from the appropriate agencies") and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(4)
(requiring that the applicant be informed of "[t]he fact that receipt of proceeds from
a viatical settlement may adversely affect the recipient's eligibility for Medicaid or
other government benefits or entitlements, and that advice should be obtained from
the appropriate agencies") with CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(d)(3) (requiring that the
applicant be informed of the "[c)onsequences for interruption of public assistance")
and N.Y. INS. LAW § 7807(b)(4) (same).
59.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 15. Life Benefactors' pamphlet advises
that "[s]ome transactions may be structured to prevent loss of means-based benefits."
Id.
60.
New York law provides that, in determining eligibility for and the amount
of public assistance, including aid for dependent children and Supplementary Security
Income,
[t)he department shall not consider the availability of an option for an accelerated payment of death benefits ... or an option to enter into a viatical settlement ... as an available resource ... provided, however, that the payment of
such benefits shall be considered in determining eligibility for and amount of
such assistance.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 366(2)(b)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1995).

942

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 28:4

or attempt to coerce or require any person ... to enter into a
viatical settlement ... as a condition of admission, providing[,]
or continuing care."61
Other disclosure requirements include informing the viator
that the proceeds of the settlement "could be subject to the
claims of creditors,"62 and that the viator has the right to
rescind the settlement within a specified period. 63 Viatical
companies also must disclose the "date by which the funds will
be available to the viator and the source of the funds." 64 In
New York, viatical companies must disclose "the identity of any
person who will receive any fee or compensation from the
viatical settlement company with respect to the viatical settlement and the amount and terms of such compensation."65 New
York also requires that viators be informed "how viatical
settlements operate,"66 a somewhat ambiguous requirement.
Vermont requires that the viatical company disclose "[t]he fact
that the viatical settlement contract is null and void if the
viatical settlement provider fails to tender payment of the
proceeds as provided in the viatical settlement contract."67
Finally, although no state regulation currently requires it,
viatical companies should be required to disclose to viators the
fact that if the viator secures a disability waiver of premium, 68
either on his own or at the request of the company, the

61.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW§ 20(2) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
62.
E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(3); VIATICAL SE1TLEMENTS MODEL ACT,
supra note 9, § 8(C). Neither California nor New York require disclosure of this
information. See CAL. INS. CODE§ 10113.2; N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807.
63.
Under the Model Act, that period is 30 days after execution or 15 days after
receipt of the funds, whichever is less. VIATICAL SE1TLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note
9, § 8(E). The rescission period is 15 days after receipt offunds in New York, N.Y. INS.
LAW § 7807(b){5), and 7 days after execution in Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §
3831(5). In California, although the viator has 15 days after execution of the settlement to rescind, CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(n), the viati.cal company is not explicitly
required to disclose this right, because the provision is not in the disclosure section
of the statute. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(d).
64.
E.g., VIATICAL SE1TLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 8(F); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 8, § 3831(6). California and New York do not require disclosure of this information.
See CAL. INS. CODE§ 10113.2; N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807.
65.
N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807(b)(6).
66.
Id. § 7807(b)(l).
67.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(7). Section 3832(e) states the conditions under
which a viatical.settlement contract is deemed void. Id. § 3832(e).
68.
A disability waiver of premium in a life insurance contract typically provides
"that if the insured becomes disabled, ... the insurer will waive the payment of
premiums that become due on the policy during the continuance of disability, however
long disability may last." MURIEL L. CRAWFORD, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE
CONTRACT 206 (1994).
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company's administrative costs decrease, and the viator should
receive a slightly higher payout.
All of these disclosure requirements seek to ensure that the
viator does not operate in a state of ignorance of his legal
rights under the states' viatical regulations and of the consequences of viatication. Simply requiring disclosure, however,
is not enough. The timing of the disclosure of information can
have a substantial impact on whether that information has its
intended effects. The NAIC's Model Act mandates that disclosure of all required information be made "no later than the
date the viatical settlement contract is signed by all parties."69
Vermont's law similarly requires disclosure "prior to the
execution of the viatical settlement contract by the viator."70
These provisions would allow viatical companies to disclose
important information-such as alternatives to viatication, the
effects of viatication on means-tested government benefits, and
the taxability of the settlement-very late in the process, at a
point when the viator is unlikely to pull out to explore other
options or carefully consider the information that he has just
been given. This is a serious flaw in the NAIC's Model Act and
Vermont's statute, one which requires correction. California
has recognized this defect and instead requires that all disclosures be made "at the time of solicitation for the viatical settlement. "71 New York similarly requires disclqsure " [u] pon receipt
of an application for a viatical settlement." 72 States adopting
their own regulations should follow the lead of California and
New York in this respect.

C. Licensing Requirements
The Model Act and all existing state statutes require that
viatical providers be licensed by the state's insurance commissioner.73 An application for a license must include a licensing fee 74 and must disclose the identity of shareholders,
69. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 8.
70.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831.
71.
CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(d)(l) (emphasis added).
72.
N.Y. INS. LAw § 7807(b) (emphasis added).
73.
See, e.g., VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 3(A); CAL. INS.
CODE § 10113.2(b)(l); N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7802(a); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(a).
74.
VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 3(B). The amount of this
licensing fee varies widely from state to state. California's initial licensing fee is
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partners, officers, and employees of the viatical company. 75
After the filing of the application, the insurance commissioner
generally is given the power to investigate such people regarding their character, competence, experience and training, and
business reputation and to issue a license upon finding the
applicants to be worthy in these categories. 76 Because viatical
companies occupy a· position of trust and confidence with
viators, 77 who entrust to companies confidential medical information and large sums of money, a licensing requirement is a
reasonable way to ensure the trustworthiness of viatical
providers.
Once a company has been granted a license, the insurance
commissioner is empowered to revoke or refuse to renew it for
a number of reasons, including misrepresentations in the
application for the license, 78 fraudulent or dishonest practices
or incompetence in conducting business, 79 a pattern of unreasonable payments to viators, 80 conviction of a crime involving
fraud or moral turpitude, 81 or violation of any provision of the
state's viatical settlement act. 82 In addition to the disclosure
requirements, a licensed viatical company is typically required

$2833, with an annual renewal fee of $177. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(b)(l), (3). New
York's initial fee is $2500, with an annual renewal fee of $1000. N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 7802(b)-(c). Vermont's initial fee is only $50, with an annual renewal fee of the same
amount. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(b)-(c).
75. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 3(0); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10113.2(b)(l); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7802(d); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(d).
76. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 3(F); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 7802(0; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(0. California vests additional discretion in its
commissioner, allowing him to deny a license application if "it is determined that it
is contra'ry to the interests of the public to issue a license to the applicant." CAL. INS.
CODE § 10113.2(b)(l).
77.
The National ViaticalAssociation acknowledges in its statement of standard
business practices that representatives of viatical companies have fiduciary duties.
NVA INFORMATION BOOKLET, supra note 32, at 16.
78. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4(A)(l); N.Y. INS.
LAW§ 7803(a)(l); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3828(a)(l).
79. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4(A)(2); N.Y. INS.
LAW§ 7803(a)(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3828(a)(2).
80. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4(A)(3); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 8, § 3828(a)(3).
81. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4(A)(4); N.Y. INS.
LAW§ 7803(a)(3); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3828(a)(4).
82. E.g.,VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4(A)(5); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 7803(a)(4); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3828(a)(5); cf CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(b)(2)
(providing that the commissioner can revoke or refuse to renew a license if granting
or continuing the license is "contrary to the interests of the public").
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to file for the insurance commissioner's approval a copy of all
viatical settlement forms used by the company. 83
Although one commentator has suggested that licensing
viatical settlement companies "impair[s] aviator's right to sell
their [sic] insurance policies,"84 most members of the industry
accept licensing and other regulation as a necessary step to
lend accountability and credibility to the growing industry. 85
The staunchly anti-regulation National Viatical Association
(NVA), which in 1994 represented over half of the nation's
viatical companies, 86 has become something of a fringe group,
with the number of member companies it represents dropping
to fifteen as of early 1995. 87 The Viatical Association of America (VAA) apparently has ascended to take the NVA's place as
the industry's leader, embracing as a reasonable cost of doing

83. E.g., VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 5; CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10113.2(c).
84. Berner, supra note 16, at 59. In making this argument, Ms. Berner adopts
the arguments of fringe members of the viatical settlement industry who claim that
regulation ofviatical settlements is an infringement of the viator's right to alienate
freely his property. See, e.g.' NATIONAL VIATICAL Ass'N, UNTITLED (n.d.) (stating that
regulation of viatical settlements is a "needless infringement on the rights of
individual citizens") (on file with the University of Michigan Journal ofLaw Reform).
Interestingly, only viatical companies, and not viators, have promoted this property
rights argument. The only "right" with which licensing interferes is a consumer's right
to undertake a major economic transaction with possibly unscrupulous and unaccountable viatical companies. See Sean Armstrong, AIDS and the Trusted Advisor, BEST'S
REV., Sept. 1994, at 40. Armstrong quotes former Iowa Insurance Commissioner David
Lyons as saying that" 'the veil on (the property rights argument] is pretty thin. If you
talk to most insureds, their concern is that we do not unduly restrict a market.'" Id.
85. See, e.g., Jim Connolly, Viatical Cos. Seem Ready to Embrace Regulation,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Nov. 28, 1994, at 21 (noting that "(t]he general sentiment of
those in the viatical settlement industry is that greater regulatory scrutiny will make
the business more credible and profitable"); see also Viatical Ass'n of Am., Viatical
Settlement Companies Form New Trade Association (Press Release) (Feb. 24, 1995)
[hereinafter Press Release] (noting that the 26 member companies of the Viatical
Association of America (VAA) "unanimously voted to support the efforts of state
insurance commissioners to regulate the viatical industry based on the Viatical
Settlements Model Act") (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law

Reform).
86. Cynthia Crosson, N. Y. Viatical Companies Face Tough New Regulation, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, Aug. 8, 1994, at 3.
87. Letter from Michelle L. Saxty, Administrative Director, National Viatical
Association, to the author (Mar. 1, 1995) (including list of "Member Companies in
Good Standing" as of Feb. 13, 1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform). NVA members who disagreed with Brian Pardo, the Association's
president who is an outspoken opponent ofviatical regulation, recently attempted to
oust him as president. An Official Says Industry Can Police Policy-Buying, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1994, at 02. When the VAA held its inaugural meeting in Chicago and
decided to exclude Pardo, Pardo tried unsuccessfully to get an injunction to prohibit
the meeting. Id.
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business all the provisions in the NAIC's Model Act, but not
the NAIC's minimum payout regulations.ss
By narrowing the information gaps between PWAs and
companies, the information disclosure requirements of state
and model regulations help ensure that PWAs have the information needed to confirm that viatication is the best option
available to them. Although providing such information is not
costless, it is inexpensive, requiring companies to do little more
than print an informational sheet to -be given to all applicants
and keep viators informed throughout the settlement process.
Licensing viatical settlement providers will help keep unscrupulous operators out of an industry which, much like the
securities industry, involves a fiduciary relationship between
the client and the company. These proposals are all reasonable
and effective methods for the protection of viators.

II. PRICE REGULATION OF VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS:
Is MINIMUM PRICE REGULATION NEEDED?
According to the best estimate, a viatical settlement company
averages about twenty percent profit on a policy's face value. s9
It is important to emphasize, however, that print news reports
are the only source of data on viatical company profits. This
lack of hard data on viatical profits requires that an assumption be made, and an assumption of a twenty percent average
profit margin is reasonable based on available reports. 90

88. See Press Release, supra note 85. While the VAA supports the provisions
contained in the NAIC's Model Act, it does not support the NAIC's Model Regulation
of minimum payouts. Telephone Interview with William Kelley, Executive Director,
Viatical Association of America (Apr. 21, 1995). Its members believe that those
regulations do not fully take account of the risk viatical companies assume. Id. For
disagreement with that position, see infra Part 11.B.
89. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
90. If this assumption overstates viatical profits, it does so by not much more
than 5%. Certainly, no one has ever suggested that viatical companies are averaging
less than 10% profit. Even with profits around 15%, it does not necessarily follow that
viatical regulation would do more harm than good. Whether profits average 15% or
20%, the conclusions reached in Part I, supra, about licensing and information
disclosure requirements would remain unchanged, since those requirements impose
minimal costs on viatical settlement companies.
A lower profit average, however, could effect the analysis of minimum payout
regulations that follows. If the average profit margin ofviatical companies is actually
15%, the minimum payouts required by the NAIC's Model Regulation at the least
would have to be adjusted downward. If companies actually are profiting only 15%
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These reported average profits of twenty percent have resulted
in a call for regulations setting minimum payouts to viators. 91
Such minimums are by far the most controversial facet of
viatical settlement regulation. The disagreement focuses on
what many perceive to be the windfall profits that viatical
companies reap at the expense of viators and others argue are
legitimate business ear~ings ... Whether corrective action is
needed depends on whether these windfalls truly exist and, if
they do, on what one concludes is the source of these windfalls.
The priority of any approach, whether it is a minimum payout
regulation or the laissez-faire approach favored by some commentators,92 should be to protect PWAs from making a bad
bargain in the sale of their policies while at the same time
preserving viatication as an option. No consideration is given to
the goal of maximizing viatical investor returns, although
recognition is given to the necessity of ensuring reasonable
returns on investment and, to the extent necessary, a riskreward sufficient to attract viatical investors. Whether minimum
payout regulations can set a proper balance between these
considerations is the key question.
This Part explores three possible explanations of windfall
profits for viatical providers. First, windfall profits may not in
fact be windfalls at all. Low payouts by viatical companies might
be necessary to ensure a reasonable profit in light of the substantial risks taken by viatical companies. Second, if profits are
indeed disproportionate to risk, they may be the result of a
temporary supply-demand lag in the viatical market. If this lag
causes windfall profits, minimum payout regulation might harm
competition by discouraging companies from entering the
market, thereby preventing the increase in supply that would
result in reasonable profits to investors and larger payouts to
viators. Finally, windfall profits may result from longer-term,

on average, requiring them to increase payouts might drive them out of business by
making it difficult for them to attract investors. That result is clearly contrary to the
intent of the regulatory scheme envisioned in this Note. But average profits of 15%
do not necessarily mean that minimum payout regulations are per se unwarranted.
They still might be reasonable as a way of keeping renegade viatical companies from
making manifestly unfair purchase offers to unwary PWAs.
91.
Minimum payout regulations also can be characterized as maximum price
regulations: requiring a company to pay the via tor 70% of the policy's face value in
effect limits the viatical company's "price" to a maximum of 30% of the policy's face
value. One must be careful, however, not to equate "price" with "profit." See infra Part
11.B.
92. See sources cited supra note 30.

948

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 28:4

invidious causes that wouldjustify minimum payout regulation,
such as overreaching by viatical · companies. Which of these
sources most nearly approximates the reality of the market will
determine the proper regulatory response.

A. The NAIC Model Regulation
The NAIC hinted that minimum payout regulations might be
in the works when it included in its Viatical Settlements Model
Act a provision empowering state insurance commissioners to
"[e]stablish standards for evaluating the reasonableness of
payments under viatical settlement contracts."93 Other states
with viatical settlement legislation followed suit, adopting provisions empowering the state insurance commissioners to set a
reasonable payout schedule. 94
Not long after adopting the Model Act, the NAIC began
drafting minimum payout standards. Initially, the NAIC proposed minimum payouts, based on the viator's life expectancy,
according to the schedule shown in Table 1.
TABLE 195
NAIC DRAFT MINIMuM PAYOUT MODEL REGULATION
LIFE ExPECTANCY
(MONTHS)

MINIMuM PAYOUT

<6
6 to <12
12 to <18
18 or more

90
85
75
70

(%FACE VALUE)

In its final form, the NAIC adopted a version of the regulation
which extended its reach to viators with longer life expectancies
and which dramatically reduced the minimum payouts required under the initial version. The regulation as adopted, and
93.
VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § lO(B).
94.
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(f); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3833(2).
95.
VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL REGULATION§ 4 (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs
Draft Feb. 16, 1994) [hereinafter MODEL REGULATION Draft] (on file with the

Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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recently as enacted in Louisiana96 and Minnesota,97 sets minimum payouts according to the schedule in Table 2 ..
TABLE 298

NAIC MINIMUM PAYOUT MODEL REGULATION

I

LIFE ExPECTANCY
(MONTHS)

<6
6 to <12
12 to <18
18 to <24
24 or more

I

MINIMUM PAYOUT
(% FACE VALUE)

80
70
65
60
50

I

In both the draft and final versions of the model regulation,
viatical companies can deviate from the minimum figures by up
to five percentage points if the insurer's financial rating is lower
than the four highest categories. 99
The reasons behind the changes in the NAIC model regulation
should be clear. A regulation which requires a viatical company
to pay a minimum of seventy percent of a policy's face value to
a person with a twenty-month life expectancy may effectively
preclude viatication for that person, because the company may
not be able to cover its risks adequately in the thirty percent
margin that the regulation allows and thus may not enter into
such settlements. By reducing the minimum payout requirement
to fifty percent for people with life expectancies of twenty-four
or more months, the NAIC presumably sought to ensure that
viatical companies have the flexibility to cover their risks when
dealing with people with life expectancies that exceed eighteen

96.
1995 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1979 (West).
97.
1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 274 (West).
98. VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL REGULATION, supra note 46, § 4; see also Model
Rule Sets Viatical Minimums, INS. REGULATOR, Oct. 3, 1994, at 8, 8 (discussing the
minimum payout schedule).
99.
MODEL REGULATION Draft, supra note 95, § 4; VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL
REGULATION, supra note 46, § 4. The relevant rating is that given by the A.M. Best
Company or "a comparable rating by another rating agency." Id. A.M. Best analyzes
the performance of the insurance industry. See generally A.M. BEST Co., BEST'S
INSURANCE REPORTS, PROPERTY-CASUALTY, UNITED STATES (1995) (providing ratings
and statistical data based on an insurance company's annual financial statement).
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months. The adopted regulation is thus more finely tuned to the
viatical market than the draft version.

B. Are Viatical Companies Reaping Windfall Profits?
Viatical companies and some commentators have attempted
to justify the low payouts of viatical companies by pointing to
the substantial risks that viatical companies assume. 100 These
risks come from many sources, some substantial and others
chimerical. Whether viatical companies reap windfall profits.
depends on whether these risks are substantial enough to
explain the current level of payouts.
1. The Risk of Misestimating Life Expectancy-The primary
risk to viatical companies derives from the possibility that
viators will outlive the companies' best estimates of their life
expectancies. Although a company has access to and bases its
estimate of the viator's life expectancy on an evaluation of his
entire medical history, 101 it will likely rely heavily on the viator's
CD-4 cell count in determining his life expectancy. 102 As AIDS
progresses, a person's CD-4 cell count decreases and, with it, the
body's ability to stave off infection. 103
The cost to viati cal companies if the via tor outlives the company's life expectancy prediction can be quite substantial. What
many perceive to be woefully inadequate payouts may in fact
represent the margins necessary to compensate viatical companies for the risk that viators will outlive the company's best life
expectancy estimates and thereby cut into viatical investors' rate
100. E.g., Dean, supra note 1, at 142-43 (stating that critics oflow viatical payouts
"fail to account for the costs and risks associated with viatication [sic] investment").
101. See supra note 13.
102. This reliance stems from the fact that CD-4 cell counts correlate strongly with
susceptibility to infection. See Lawrence K Altman, New Study Questions Use ofAZT
in Early Treatment of AIDS Virus, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1993, at Al [hereinafter
Altman, New Study] (discussing effectiveness of treating AIDS before symptoms develop). CD-4 cells are the specialized immune cells that fight infections in human
blood. Id. at A2. A healthy human has a CD-4 cell count of approximately 1000 cells
per cubic millimeter of blood. Id. Under the most recent definition of AIDS provided
by the Centers for Disease Control, a person infected with the HIV virus who has 200
or fewer CD-4 cells per cubic millimeter of blood has AIDS. See Stefano Vella et al.,
Differential Survival ofPatients with AIDS According to the 1987 and 1993 CDC Case
Definitions, 271 JAMA 1197, 1197 (1994); Lawrence K Altman, Federal Health
Officials Propose an Expanded Definition of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at B9.
103. See Altman, New Study, supra note 102, at A2. CD-4 count is not always a
reliable predictor of life expectancy. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
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of return or perhaps even cause a loss. Whether this risk is
great enough to justify low viatical payouts thus depends on the
medical question of the accuracy of predictions of PWAs' life
expectancies.
The life expectancy of a PWA, from diagnosis of full-blown
AIDS until death, typically ranges from one to three years, with
two years being average. 104 A PWA, however, may live as many
as five to seven years longer than that average. 105 "AIDS, like
most other chronic diseases, does not follow regular rules of
disease expression or mortality." 106 Professor Osborn notes that
"CD4 counts are quite good predictors of a person's susceptibility
to opportunistic infections, which in turn tend to be the potentially lethal factors in AIDS; however, many people have lived
for a long time with virtually no CD4 cells AND no [opportunistic infections] ." 107 As a result, "the individual variation in clinical
course is so wide that prediction about life expectancy is very
uncertain for a given person." 108
The uncertainty is further complicated by the variability
which results from CD-4 tests themselves. As a result of this
variability,
[a] single [CD-4) test ... does not allow very accurate predictions. A series of tests reduces the variability and improves
the prognostic power. If you consider getting prognosis of
death within a one year period good, the prognostic power
of repeated tests is pretty good. You could never, however,
get down to predicting to the month. 109
104. See Male AIDS Patients Are Living Longer, Healthier, AIDS ALERT, July 1993,
at 107 (reporting a study which found that "participants diagnosed with AIDS since
1988 have an average length of survival of 24 months compared to 11.6 months for
participants diagnosed in 1984").
105. See id. at 108 (discussing PWAs surviving more than six years after infection).
106. Electronic mail message from Professor June E. Osborn, M.D., University of
Michigan, School of Public Health, to the author (Apr. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Osborn
message) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
107. Id.; see also Barbara J. Turner et al., CD4+ T·Lymphocyte Measures in the
Treatment of Individuals Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1: A
Review for Clinical Practitioners, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1561, 1565 (1994)
("Although AIDS-defining complications are common once the CD4+ count is less than
[200 cells per cubic millimete·r of blood), the association of CD4+ count and risk of
death in persons with AIDS is not as well defined.").
108. Osborn message, supra note 106.
109. Electronic mail message from Professor James Koopman, M.D., University
of Michigan, School of Public Health, to the author (Apr. 20, 1995) (on file with the
University ofMichigan Journal ofLaw Reform); see also Turner et al., supra note 107,
at 1564 {"Using information from more than one [CD-4 test) offers a ... strategy to
reduce the impact of laboratory and intraindividual variation in [CD-4) counts.").
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The possibility of misestimation of any given PWA's life expectancy is therefore quite substantial.
Nevertheless, while CD-4 counts cannot be accurate predictors
of a particular PWA's life expectancy, the fact remains that, on
average, CD-4 counts are quite reliable. A particular viator may
outlive a viatical company's estimation ofhis life expectancy and
cut into the company's profit margin. Over many viators, however, the same company should have a fairly good prediction
record and a correspondingly good profit record. For every PWA
who lives a year longer than a viatical company predicted he
would live, another PWA will die a year sooner than the same
viati cal company predicted. The inaccuracies of CD-4 counts can
cut both ways. As the president of one viatical company noted,
"I've seen a guy with a [zero] T-cell count go two years, and I've
seen one with a 260 T-cell count die in eight days." 110
If a viator outlives the company's estimation of his life expectancy, the effect that his survival can have on viatical company
profits can be quite substantial. Table C shows the present value
to a viatical company of a $100,000 life insurance policy paid a
given number of years in the future.
TABLE 3 111
PREsENT VALUE OF $100,000 LIFE INSURANCE POLICY
PAID ONE TO FOUR YEARS IN THE FU'nm.E, WITH

RATE OF RETuRN AsSUMPTIONS

YEAR

5%

10%

15%

20%

1
2
3
4

$95,200
$90,700
$86,400
$82,300

$90,900

$87,000
$75,600
$65,800
$57,200

$83,300
$69,400
$57,900
$48,200

$82,600
$75,100
$68,300

110. Eric Zicklin, Financial AIDS, SPY, Feb. 1994, at 14, 16.
111. Figures are calculated by the author from data in WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH
BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 63 tbl. 1-7 (1993). Dollar amounts in italics are
payout amounts that would be acceptable under the NAIC's model minimum payout
regulation for a PWA with a life expectancy of one year, allowing $3000 for the viatical
company's administrative costs. For a discussion of the sources of the roughly $3000
in administrative costs born by the viatical settlement company, see infra Part 11.B.3.
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Table 3 shows, for example, that if a viatical company desired
at least a 15% return on its investment, it would pay no more
than $75,600 now for a $100,000 life insurance policy payable
in two years. Most importantly, what initially appears to be a
25% profit turns out to be a 15% profit when the time-value of
money is taken into account. Table 3 also shows that if the
company had known that the viator would live for three years
instead oftwo, 112 it would have paid only $65,800 (or about 66%
of face value) for his policy to maintain its 15% rate of return.
This $9800 contingency cuts into the company's profits and is
a risk that all viatical companies must bear.
To minimize the risk of net losses, viatical companies have
been insisting on relatively low payouts. 113 By doing so, they
ensure that, even if the viator outlives their best estimate of his
life expectancy, they still have a large margin of error before
their miscalculation results in a net loss. A viatical company
which maintains this margin of error can still earn a positive
rate of return-even if it is only around five percent-if the
viator substantially outlives its best estimate of his life expectancy.
Of course, a five percent rate of return might not be enough
to please investors who could have earned at least that much
in no-risk investments in government bonds. Investors will
insist on a higher return for the risk that they are taking, but
they likely will be willing to risk a five percent return when a
viator lives substantially longer than expected for the chance of
a thirty percent return when a viator dies before expected.
Consider the effect of the NAIC's Model Regulation 114 in the
following hypothetical. Sam, a PWA, applies to ABC Viaticals,
a viatical settlement provider, to viaticate his $100,000 life
insurance policy. After ABC Viaticals's physicians review all of
Sam's medical history, they determine that his life expectancy
is approximately one year. On that basis, ABC Viaticals offers
and Sam accepts a viatical settlement of $80,000-an amount
that exceeds the NAIC's minimum payout model regulation by

112. A few viatical companies recently have shown a willingness to accept policies
of persons with life expectancies that exceed two years, although none have been
willing to go beyond three years. See James Daw, U.S. Firm Seeks Inuestors in Death:
Millions Made on Life Insurance of Terminally Ill, TORONTO STAR, May 27, 1994, at
El, ES; Josephine Marcotty & Glenn Howlatt, Terminally Ill Can Use Cash to Pay
Bills, Fulfill Dreams, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Nov. 14, 1993, at lD.
113. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
114. See supra Part II.A tbl. 2.
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fifteen percent. 115 If ABC Viaticals's physicians have predicted
Sam's life expectancy correctly, the company will have realized
approximately a twenty percent return, even after allowing
$3000 for the company's administrative costs. 116 That twenty
percent return at the end of the future year equals a profit of
roughly $17 ,000. If Sam lives only six months, ABC Viaticals
earns 40% return on its investment.
If, in spite of the best estimates of ABC Viaticals's physicians,
Sam lives two years instead of one, the company still receives
more than a ten percent return on its investment. If Sam lives
three years, ABC Viaticals would still receive a return of approximately five percent on its initial $100,000 investment. In fact,
only if Sam lives for four years does the company realize less
than a five percent return on its purchase of Sam's insurance
policy. Thus, the NAIC's minimum payout regulations leave
ample room for ABC Viaticals to profit handsomely, while still
protecting Sam from a grossly inadequate payout.
Two factors thus are relevant in concluding that the risk of
the viator's extended survival does not warrant the current level
of viatical payouts and that the NAIC's Model Regulation sets
appropriate payout minimums. First, misestimations resulting
from reliance on CD-4 counts will balance out across many
PWAs over time. On average, the company's predictions will be
reasonably accurate, and its overall profits reasonably stable.
Second, the NAIC's minimum payout regulations provide ample
room for profit in the face of extended viator survival, allowing
the viator to substantially outlive his life expectancy without a
net loss to the company. The risk that the viator will outlive the
viatical company's best estimate of his life expectancy does not
explain the low payouts currently offered by viatical companies.
2. Other Risks-Viatical companies assume other risks in
the settlement process for which they should receive reasonable
compensation. The financial stability of the viator's insurance
company is one such source of risk. If the insurance company
folds, or otherwise defaults on its obligations under the policy,
the viatical company might be left with a valueless policy: it has
paid to become the beneficiary of a policy that will not be paid.
Many states, however, protect policyholders against insurer
defaults by assuming financial responsibility for the policy
115. See supra Part II.A tbl. 2.
116. See supra Part 11.B. l tbl. 3. For a discussion of administrative costs, see infra
Part 11.B.3. Of course, the provider's administrative costs go up as the viator lives
longer.
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benefit in the event that the insurer becomes insolvent. Viatical
companies themselves can protect against the risk of default by
the insurer by only purchasing policies issued by highly rated
insurance companies. Companies that wish to buy less highlyrated policies, however, should be encouraged to do so, because
by so doing they make viatication an option for more PWAs. The
NAIC Model Regulation provides such encouragement. Section
Four of that regulation allows viatical companies to take account
of the risk of default in the settlement amount by lowering their
payout by five percentage points if the viator's insurance company has an A.M. Best rating lower than the four highest ratings.117
Beyond default, any factor that could distort the accuracy of
the viatical company's estimation of the viator's life expectancy
is a source of risk for a viatical company. The possibility that a
cure will be found for AIDS, or that better life-lengthening AIDS
treatments will develop, are two such risks. Like the risk that
the viator will outlive the company's prediction of his life
expectancy, a life-prolonging treatment for AIDS could result in
a diminished return or net loss to the viatical company.
Although the "risk" of an AIDS treatment or cure 118 may be
a real threat to the long-term viability of the viatical settlement
companies, those risks are probably not very substantial at the
level of the individual viator. A <;:ure for AIDS, if found, might

117. See supra note 99.
118. Recall the reminder in the Introduction of this Note that one of the more
disturbing aspects of the viatical settlement industry is that improved AIDS treatments and cures become a "risk," not a benefit. This fact can have disturbing public
policy implications. Consider "notoriously anti-gay" Texas State Representative
Warren Chisum, who has invested $200,000 in viatical settlements and who has
"voted against ... a variety of ... programs to help AIDS victims." Molly Ivins, Death
Futures Trade a Sad Wrinkle in Capitalism, HOUSTON POST, Mar. 16, 1994, at A27
(editorial). There is considerable danger in having "someone shaping public policy who
has an open monetary interest in seeing that the [AIDS] epidemic continues and that
no cure is found." Id.
The NAIC's Model Regulation contains a conflict-of-interest rule providing that
"[v]iatical settlement providers and brokers shall not solicit investors who could
influence the treatment of the illness of the viators whose coverage would be the
subject of the investment." VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL REGULATION, supra note
46, § 6(G). It is arguable that the viatical companies that solicited Representative
Chisum's investment would fall within this regulation. The emphasis of the regulation
is on the "illness of the viator," not the viator himself, so it would seem that § 6(G)
would not require that Chisum be able to influence a particular viator's treatment,
as long as he could influence the treatment of that viator's illness. Whether this
regulation would apply to Chisum thus depends on whether "treatment" is limited
to direct medical care, or whether it includes, for example, legislation that would
provide free treatment to PWAs.
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mean that viatical companies can no longer viaticate the policies
of PWAs, but it will not likely mean that those PWAs whose
policies the companies already own will be cured. 119 A cure for
AIDS probably would help HIV-positive individuals and only
those PWAs who are in the earlier stages of AIDS. AIDS may
have progressed too far in many viators, for whom a cure
tragically may come too late. Moreover, a cure for AIDS would
by no means signal the end of the viatical settlement industry.
The ongoing diversification of viatical companies into policies of
terminal cancer patients and other terminally ill people lessens
the exposure of viatical companies to the possibility of a cure or
life-prolonging treatment for AIDS and a consequent decline in
business.
Finally, one purported source of risk should be discredited.
Although some commentators have claimed that viatical companies should be compensated for the risk of litigation by disappointed prior beneficiaries or those with legal interests in the
policy, 120 these risks are largely nonexistent. Revocable beneficiaries under a life insurance policy have no legal right to
enforce, and thus no claim to bring, when the viator replaces
them with the viatical company as beneficiary. 121 To minimize
the risk oflitigation further, viatical companies require anyone
who does have an interest in the policy to sign a written release
of their interest before the company accepts the policy for
viatication. 122 As a result, litigation brought by someone with
prior ownership or some other legal interest in the policy rarely
will occur. Even if it does occur, it likely will be dismissed
because of the waiver.
That this risk oflitigation is minimal has been born out by the
case law reported to date. Of the four reported cases involving
viatical companies, none has been brought by a disappointed
former beneficiary. 123 In fact, one of those cases, Goldberg u.
119. See Zicklin, supra note 110, at 14 (quoting the vice president of a California
viatical settlement company as saying "[elven if a cure for AIDS were found tomorrow,
no one with a 24-month life expectancy could be helped").
120. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 1, at 135 n.87, 142 & n.110.
121. See CRAWFORD, supra note 68, at 244 (noting that policyowners can terminate
at will the rights of a revocable beneficiary).
122. See, e.g., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 15.
123. See, e.g., SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 94-1861, 1995 WL 517641, at *2
(D.D.C. Aug. 30, 1995) (involving the SEC's case against defendant viatical company
alleging that the company violated various provisions of the Securities Act of 1933
and Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Stephens v. Meininger (In re Credit Life Corp.),
184 B.R. 839, 840 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (involving a policyholder who sought
reversal of bankruptcy court's imposition of a stay on his civil suit against viatical
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Miller, 124 pitted viatical companies against each other. In
Goldberg, aviator completed a viatical settlement only to learn
that another viatical company was willing to pay him a substantially higher settlement. 125 The viator asked the initial company
to rescind its agreement with him and allow him to enter into
the agreement for a greater amount with the second company. 126
The initial company eventually agreed, accepting its money back
plus an additional amount to cover costs, 127 but then brought a
claim for tortious interference with contractual relations against
the second viatical company. 128 The court held that no tortious
interference with contract had occurred because there had been
no underlying breach of contract by the viator. 129 If Goldberg is
any indication, viatical companies apparently risk litigation with
competitors over who signed the viator first more than they risk
litigation by prior beneficiaries or people with property interests
in the viator's policy.
3. Administrative Costs-A viatical company must pay
significant administrative costs for each policy it viaticates. One
source places the average administrative cost at $3000 per
viatication. 130 These costs derive from mailing and telephone
expenses, legal fees incurred in the viatication process, including
the expense of securing releases from prior beneficiaries, and the
fees of the physicians who conduct a review of each PWA's
medical history. 131
These administrative costs also include the viatical company's
expenditures in paying the viator's insurance premiums between
viatication and death. The viati cal company, however, does not
always incur this expense. Many insurance policies offer a
disability waiver of premium, under which the insurer or the
company to determine ownership of his life insurance policy); Protective Life Ins. Co.
v. Sullivan, 892 F. Supp. 299, 300 (D. Mass. 1995) (involving a suit by a life insurance
company against a viatical company alleging that the policyholder initially procured
the policy through fraud and misrepresentation); Goldbergv. Miller, 874 F. Supp. 874,
876 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (involving a viatical company's suit against a policyholder and a
competitor company for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract,
respectively). This list of cases is based on a search of the Allcases database on
Westlaw in November 1995.
124. 874 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
125. Id. at 875-76.
126. Id. at 876.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 875.
129. Id. at 879.
130. Carole C. Lamson, Legal Introduction to Living Benefits in Life Insurance:
New Perspectives and Developments, N.Y. STATE B.J., Nov. 1993, at 16, 16.
131. Id. at 16-17.
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policyholder's employer agrees to take over the policyholder's
payment of premiums in the event that the policyholder becomes
disabled and unable to pay the premium himself. 132 If the
viator's policy offers such a waiver of premium and the viator
has not exercised the waiver option, the viatical company will
encourage, though probably not require, the viator to secure the
disability waiver. If the viator secures the waiver before
viaticating his policy, the viatical company will not have to take
over payment of the policyholder's premiums upon viatication
and should therefore increase its payout to the viator. 133
All of these risks and costs are real and substantial, but they
are not substantial enough to explain the current low level of
viatical payouts, which result in an average profit of around
twenty percent after administrative expenses have been taken
into account. 134 Of course, taking all of these risks and costs into
account strongly refutes the initial reactions of the press and
some commentators that viatical companies enjoy no-risk,
windfall profits at the expense of PWAs. Yet,· even after an
exhaustive and detailed look at the risks and costs of viatical
settlements, the fact remains that viatical companies' profits are
disproportionate to the risks that they take and the costs that
they bear, and they cannot be explained wholly on those bases.
In spite of this evidence, student commentators, some advocates for PWAs, and representatives of most viatical companies
have adopted a laissez-faire approach to minimum payout
regulations, displaying a Friedmanesque reverence for the power
of market competition. 135 For the most part, these people resemble Chicago-school economists, who "tendD to be rather more
sanguine than other economists about the proximity of real

132. CRAWFORD, supra note 68, at 206.
133. NVA INFORMATION BOOKLET, supra note 32, at 9. Companies "should" increase
their payments but do not necessarily do so. There is plenty of room for viatical
companies to require that the viator secure the disability waiver without increasing
its payout offer. Viators might not realize that, by exercising the waiver, they are
providing a substantial benefit to the viatical company for which they should be
compensated in the settlement.
134. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Freeman Statement, supra note 2, at 787 (emphasizing marketplace
notions of efficiency and receiving the best price for the insurance policy); Berner,
supra note 16, at 600 (arguing that, "by discouraging higher settlement offers, the
operation of minimum rate regulations denies via tors the benefits of the competitive
nature of the open market"); Dean, supra note 1, at 147 (arguing that minimum
payout regulations "deny [companies] reasonable profit margins" and will reduce
competition); supra note 88 (discussing the fact that the Viatical Association of
America does not support minimum payouts).
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world markets to the perfect state. Correspondingly, [they]
tendD to be slower than others to perceive the need for corrective action." 136 Average profits of twenty percent, not wholly
explained by risk and higher than investments of comparable
riskiness, can be deemed "supernormal" profits. But calling
viatical profits "supernormal" does not by itself make a case for
minimum payout regulation. For example, these profits may be
the result. of a temporary supply-demand lag in the viatical
market, or they may be a proper reward for the innovation of
viatical settlement companies. If a supply-demand lag is the
cause, minimum payout regulation might harm competition by
discouraging companies from entering the market, thereby
preventing the increase in supply that would result in more
reasonable profits to investors and larger payouts to viators. If
viatical settlements remain an innovation; supernormal profits
might be a proper reward for that innovation and therefore
worth maintaining for the time being. The next section explores
possible market explanations for and functions of supernormal
viatical profits, seeking to determine whether the viatical
market is as close to the perfect state as is assumed by other
commentators and whether minimum payout regulation would
be beneficial or harmful to the viatical market under those
alternative explanations.

C. An Industry-Wide View of the Viatical
Settlement Industry
Large profit margins like the twenty percent average margin
enjoyed by the viatical settlements industry suggest that the
market is not performing as it should. Such "persistent ...
excess or supernormal profits are generally signs of unworkable
performance." 137 The ideal performance for an industry "should
move as long-run averages toward amounts just sufficient to pay
normal interest returns on owners' investments, plus a 'risk
reward' to successful firms sufficient to offset the losses of
unsuccessful ones."138 "Supernormal profits" are thus profits
which are disproportionate to risk and to normal interest
136. A.J. DUGGAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION: A CRITIQUE OF THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL CASE AGAINST INTERVENTION 17 (1982).
137. JOE s. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 14 (1968) (emphasis added).
138. Id.
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returns in other industries and investments. 139 The fac~ that
supernormal profits have been the norm in the viatical settlements market suggests a lack of workable competition which
might necessitate regufatory intervention.
Professor Bain has suggested that supernormal profits in an
industry can result from four causes:··
1. Misestimation of future demand or cost, or lagging adjustment to changing demand or cost, resulting in positive
"windfalls" to firms or industries ....
2. The riskiness of business investment in various lines,
resulting in the payment of"risk rewards" to successful risktakers (but also in losses to the unsuccessful gamblers).
3. The introduction ofinnovations ... by some firms, resulting in "reward to innovation [sic]." . . .
4. Monopolistic or monopsonistic restriction of output and
raising of selling prices in relation to costs by the industry
140

Determining which of these dynamics explains the supernormal
profits enjoyed by the viatical industry will go a long way in
determining the proper regulatory response, if indeed any regulatory response is warranted. Before examining each of these
explanations, however, it will be useful to reexamine briefly the
current development of the viatical settlement market.
1. The Current Landscape of the Viatical Market-The first
viatical settlement company commenced business in 1988. 141 In
a relatively short period of time, the number of companies grew
to approximately fifty-eight in 1994. Of these fifty-eight companies, over half are located in California, New York, Florida, and
Texas. 142 As a result of this concentration of companies, the
competitiveness of the market for viaticals varies naturally and

139. Id.
140. Id. at 397-98.
141. Quint, supra note 11, at D2.
142. AB of March 13, 1995, California had 12 viatical companies, New York had
7, and Texas and Florida had 6 companies each; the remaining 27 were located in
Alabama (1), Georgia (3), Illinois (3), Kansas (1), Kentucky (1), Louisiana (2),
Maryland (2), Massachusetts (1), Michigan (1), Minnesota (1), Missouri (2), New
Jersey (1), North Carolina (1), Ohio (4), Utah (1), and Virginia (2). Viatical Settlement
Firms (unpublished list supplied by the National ABsociation of People With AIDS)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (tabulations by the
author).
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substantially from state to state. Viatical companies can buy
policies nationwide, 143 and many advertise their toll-free telephone numbers in nationally circulated gay publications like The
Advocate and Poz, a magazine for HIV-positive gay men. These
fifty-eight viatical companies together purchased approximately
$300 million worth of life insurance policies, or nearly 4000
policies, in 1994. 144 Most companies are rather small, having the
capacity to purchase only five to ten million dollars in policies. 145
2. The Supply-Demand Lag-With only fifty-eight relatively small viatical companies in business in 1994, the supply
of settlements may have lagged far behind demand. When
supernormal profits result "because· considerable time is
necessarily consumed in expanding capacity to meet an experienced increase in demand"-a "supply-demand lag"-they
"are justifiable as a necessary incident of the efficient working
of a market system under dynamic conditions with uncertainty,
and desirable as incentives to hurry a more appropriate
adjustment of supply to demand." 146 If there is far greater
demand for viatical settlements than the existing viatical
settlement companies can provide, and supernormal viatical
profits result from this supply-demand lag, minimum payout
regulation might take away needed incentives for new firms
to enter the viatical industry.
Information that can determine the level of development of
the viatical industry is quite sparse, but that does not render
all conclusions unduly speculative. The supply that viatical
settlement companies currently are able to provide is a fraction
of the demand for viatical settlements. in 1994, viatical companies bought fewer than 4000 policies. 147 Safely assuming that
the 4000 policies represent a small fraction of the number of
terminally ill people who in 1994 owned life insurance and
who, had they known of the possibility of viatication, would
have elected to viaticate, it follows that the demand for viatical
settlements vastly exceeds the supply that existing viatical

143. Those states that license viatical companies require licensure not only of
companies located in the state but also of companies that buy policies of viators
residing in the state. E.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.l(d), .2(b)(l); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 7802(a), (0(3); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(a), (0(4).
144. Quint, supra note 11, at D2.
145. Id.
146. BAIN, supra note 137, at 398.
147. Quint, supra note 11, at D2.
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companies can provide. 148 This assumption is borne out by
anecdotal evidence from a viatical representative, who stated:
"'We have more sellers than we can possibly handle .... There
are about five policies available for every single-policy buyer.' "149 Although the viatical industry is growing at· a· rapid
pace, it will be years before companies can attract enough
investment to approach the demand for viatical settlements.
Because a supply-demand lag exists, viatical companies can
pay less for policies than they would have to pay in a more
competitive market. Minimum payout regulation in such an
underdeveloped market actually could harm PWAs. The simple
but powerful argument put forth by members of the viatical
settlement industry and some advocates for PWAs contends:
"The natural dynamics of the marketplace force [viatical]
companies to strive for the efficiency that will allow them to
offer the largest settlement. "150 Minimum payout regulations
reduce viatical companies' supernormal profits, thereby removing the incentive for new companies and investors to enter the
viatical market. This results in little new competition for
existing companies and also stagnates the number and amount
of payouts available to the terminally ill. The solution, opponents of regulation claim, lies in allowing the competitive
pressures of the free market to drive settlement amounts
higher. 151 Low payouts to viators are the result of a temporary
lack of competition. By allowing the market to develop unfettered by minimum payout regulation, new companies will
continue to enter the market, competition will increase, and
higher payouts to viators and more reasonable returns for
viatical investors will result.
This argument may be correct and at least calls for great
caution in setting minimum payout levels. It does not, however,
lead necessarily to the conclusion that any minimum price
regulations would diminish substantially the incentives to
enter the viatical market. Whether ·minimum payout regulations will have the feared effect of diminished entry depends
entirely upon where the minimum payout is set. If minimum

148. See Fulmer, supra note 26, § 1, at 1 ("The fact that not many firms are
competing for the business means that there is little pressure to give clients larger
cash settlements .... ").
149. Zicklin, supra note 110, at 17 (quoting the president of a New York viatical
settlement company).
150. Freeman Statement, supra note 2, at 787.
151. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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payouts are set too high, they would take away much of the
incentive for new firms to enter the viatical industry and could
thereby prevent the increased supply that would result in
larger payouts to viators and more reasonable profits to investors. Setting minimums too low would preserve incentives to
enter the viatical market but would vitiate much of the consumer protection effects that provided. the impetus behind
regulation in the first place. The challenge is to set minimum
payouts that preserve (but necessarily diminish) incentives to
entry and still provide meaningful protection for PWAs.
The NAIC's draft minimums too strongly favored viators and
likely would have had a substantial adverse effect on entry
incentives. 152 The draft regulations allowed little room for the
viator to outlive his life expectancy and still provide the
viatical company with a return commensurate with that risk. 153
The NAIC wisely rejected them. The minimums actually
adopted by the NAIC, however, will not likely have a substantial effect on incentives for entry and will provide a significant
measure of protection for viators. 154 As discussed earlier, those
minimums allow significant room for the viatical company to
earn a healthy return even on a viator who significantly
outlives his life expectancy. 155 One cannot say that new viatical
companies will cease to attract investors in the face of these
regulations, when the regulations still make possible favorable
rates of return. The more skilled the company becomes at
accurately predicting the life expectancy of the PWA, the
greater the company's profit on the policy. Although the
minimum payout regulations surely will make viaticals less
attractive to investors than they were with no regulation, even
payout-regulated viatical settlements will remain a profitable
investment under the NAIC's model.
Although supernormal profits may result from a lag between
the supply of settlements which viatical companies can provide
and the demand for settlements which currently exists, the
NAIC's minimum payouts will not interfere unduly with market
development. Moreover, the supply-demand lag might be only
partly responsible for supernormal profits. Such profits also
might result from something more invidious-like overreaching

152.
153.
154.
155.

See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra

Part II.A tbl. 1.
Part II.A.
Part II.A. tbl. 2.
Part 11.B.1.
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by viatical companies-that makes minimum payout regulations
desirable as a consumer protection measure. 156
3. Profit as a Risk-Reward-Professor Bain's second cause
of supernormal ·industry profits is "the riskiness of business
investment. "157 The risk that the viator will substantially
outlive the viatical company's best estimate of his life expectancy158 justifies a risk-reward but is not substantial enough to
explain the twenty percent average profit which viatical
companies currently enjoy. 159 The problem with viewing the
supernormal profits of the viatical industry as a proper
risk-reward is that, over a period of time, in a properly functioning market, "the risk rewards earned by successful firms
should be at least roughly offset by the losses of unsuccesful
[sic] firms." 160 Although only a few viatical firms have failed,
the losses of the few companies that have failed do not
approach the profits of those that have succeeded. 161 A
risk-reward was justified in the first years of the viatical
industry, as companies entered an uncertain and highly
speculative market characterized by legal uncertainty. Now,
with no state prohibiting viatical settlements seven years after
their creation, and with the NAIC's model regulation in place,
that climate of uncertainty has waned considerably.
4. Rewards for Innovation-A reward to viatical companies
also might be justified in the first years of the industry, not as
a risk-reward but as a reward for innovation. This is Professor
Bain's third explanation for supernormal profits. 162 While
supernormal profits may exist to reward entrepreneurs for the
innovation of viatical settlements, innovation rewards should
not be long term. 163 "Such rewards should emerge as the

156. Part 11.D infra considers this possibility.
157. BAIN, supra note 137, at 397.
158. See supra Part 11.B.1-2.
159. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
160. BAIN, supra note 137, at 399.
161. At least one of the viatical firms that failed did so willfully, by taking the
money of PWAs and disappearing with it. See Nan Lee, Was Insurance Policy Buyout
a Rip-off? AIDS Victims Sue Viatical Firm for Fraud, DAILY REP. (Atlanta Bar Ass'n,
Fulton County, Georgia), Mar. 21, 1994, at 1, 2 (noting one PWA who dealt with a
corrupt viatical settlement company and who settled for only $45,000 for a policy with
a $180,000 face value, only $31,000 of which was actually paid to him). Unfortunately,
while reports of successful viatical firms abound, the failings of viatical firms rarely
are reported. Only when a viatical firm bilks viators out of their money and then
closes does the press pay attention. See, e.g., id. at 2-3.
162. BAIN, supra note 137, at 397-98.
163. Id. at 400.
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successful innovator 'leads the parade' in . . . increasing
revenue with a new product, enjoying some period of extra
profits until he has been fully and successfully imitated by
other firms in his industry." 164 The viatical industry is young,
but not so young that all viatical firms are "innovators" worthy
of a reward for innovation. The existence of nearly sixty
viatical companies suggests that the initial innovators have
been "successfully imitated by other firms" and that the time
for supernormal profits as a reward for innovation has since
passed. 165 As Professor Bain notes, "true rewards to innovation
... should not favor all firms, or even all principal firms, in an
industry equally." 166 Supernormal viatical profits therefore
cannot be explained on this basis.
5. Monopsony 167-Even though supernormal profits result
at least partly from a supply-demand lag, there remains the
possibility that supply may never catch up with demand, or
that it may catch up only after an unacceptably long period. In
spite of the existence of nearly sixty viatical companies, a
monopsonistic market structure might exist. This is Professor
Bain's final cause of supernormal profits: 168
[T]he only sort of excess profits that tend to be reflected in
long-term average profits for entire industries are monopolistic excess profits. All other types of excess profit are
likely to occur sporadically and irregularly, or to be confined to only part of the firms of an industry .169
One viatical company representative hinted that viatical
companies enjoy a monopsony when he stated that "[t]here are
more policies here [in the United States] than we could ever
afford to buy." 170 Of course, viatical companies looking for
investors have obvious incentives to overstate their potential
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 401.
167. Ifviatical settlements·are considered a service sold by a viatical settlement
company to the viator, then monopoly would be the correct term here. If viatical
settlement companies are considered not as sellers of a service but as buyers of life
insurance policies, then monopsony is the correct term. Either characterization is
plausible, but the author thinks the latter more accurately depicts the viatical settlement industry.
168. BAIN, supra note 137, at 398.
169. Id. at 401.
170. Daw, supra note 112, at El, ES (quoting Frederick Hollander, vice-president
of the Florida viatical company United Benefits).
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for growth; but there is also truth in the viatical representative's statement. Although the number of PWAs who have life
insurance and are financially strapped is unknown, viatical
companies purchased only around 4000 policies in 1994. 171 That
number is much lower than even a conservative estimate of the
number of policies available in the pool offinanc~ally strapped
PWAs with life insurance. When the number of PWAs. is
combined with the more than 500,000 terminal cancer patients
who die each year in the United States, 172 it quickly bec~mes
clear that it will be a long time before the viatical industry can
catch up to demand.
It may be that this supply-demand lag which currently
makes large profits possible is not at all temporary, but likely
to stretch years into the future. The possibility of monopsony
also argues for minimum payout regulation as the only way to
restrain companies from exploiting their superior position in
the market to reap high profits at the expense of the terminally
ill.
6. A Narrowing Market-The fact that viatical settlements
are not the only source of money to which some PWAs can turn
in order to lessen their financial strain decreases concerns
about the superior position of viatical firms in relation to
demand. The life insurance industry's aggressive response to
the proliferation of viatical settlement companies through the
rapid expansion of accelerated benefits increasingly and
substantially will reduce the demand for viatical settlements,
as well as provide an alternative-and in many respects superi·
or-source of funds. 173 From 1991 to 1994, the number of life
insurance companies offering an accelerated benefit option
increased ninety percent, from 113 to 215 companies. 174 The
expanded availability of accelerated benefits also likely will
slow new entries into the viatical market.
Nevertheless, viatical settlements will remain an option for
PWAs when an accelerated benefit arrangement is impossible-that is, when the PWA has a life expectancy of more than

171. See Quint, supra note 11, at 02.
172. Id.
173. For a more detailed discussion of the accelerated benefits option, see infra
Part III.
174. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INS. & LIMRA INT'L, ACCELERATED DEATH
BENEFITS: 1994 UPDATE 4 & fig. 1 (1994) [hereinafter ACCELERATED BENEFITS UPDATE)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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12 months. 175 Because most accelerated benefits options limit
the amount 'the policyholder can accelerate to fifty percent or
less of the policy's face value, 176 PWAs who accelerate may also
be able to viaticate the portion of their policy that remains
after acceleration. For example, a PWA possibly can receive by
means of acceleration up to fifty percent of his policy's face
value and still viaticate the remaining fifty percent. The
availability of accelerated benefits thus does not signal the end
ofviatical settlements, even for those PWAs whose life expectancies are short enough to make acceleration possible.
Viatical company profits cannot be explained as a reward for
innovation but can be explained partially as both a risk-reward
and the result of a supply-demand lag. These partial explanations mandate considerable caution in setting the level of
minimum· price regulations, but they do not rule out such
regulations. The possibility of a monopsonistic market structure argues in favor of minimum price regulation. When the
possibilities for overreaching explored in the next section are
considered, the case for minimum price regulations becomes
stronger.

D. Overreaching
Even ifthe supply-demand lag in the viatical market is only
temporary, the potential for supernormal profits still might
exist once the supply of via ti cal settlements has caught up with
demand. "Overreaching'' by viatical companies in their dealings
with vulnerable PWAs might support minimum payout regulation even if payouts ·will increase as more firms enter the
viatical industry. Overreaching occurs when an unscrupulous
viatical firm takes advantage of a PWA's compromised emotional state and desperate financial situation to gain a more
favorable settlement for itself than it otherwise could obtain
from a fully informed and rational decision maker, for whom
obtaining money is not a matter of life or death.
To the extent that minimum payout regulations grow out of
a desire to protect PWAs from overreaching, they are paternalistic, and paternalism seems to be an unsound foundation

175. See infra Part III.
176. See infra Part III.
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for regulation. But what some dismiss as paternalism actually
relates to concerns about the ability of certain consumers to
make rationaljudgments. 177 H.L.A. Hart defended paternalism
as an acknowledgment of "'a great range of factors which
diminish the significance to be attached to an apparently free
choice."' 178 Only if one believes that consumers always make
rational judgments can one dismiss the concerns about overreaching that minimum payout regulations attempt to address.
All but the most stringent adherents to unrestrained
competition recognize that there are situations in which interference with free market forces protects consumer interests and
that consumers are not always rational economic decision
makers. 179 Efficiency analysis presupposes that "[e]ach individual in the market is ... the best judge of his own interests and
[can] act rationally, maximising his utility." 180 This model of
the rational economic decision maker may not be appropriate
for some PWAs. PWAs who viaticate, by definition, have life
expectancies of two years or less. 181 In the face of such prospects, fully informed, rational economic decisions might not
always be possible. If this happens in enough cases, the assumptions of the efficiency analysis fail, making a prima facie
case for intervention in the market. 182
In his report on viatical settlements entitledA System for the
Exploitation of the Terminally Ill, Joseph Belth noted that
"persons who are terminally ill, and those close to them,
probably are undergoing greater stress than they have ever
experienced. Under those circumstances, they are easily
confused and may be vulnerable to exploitation." 183 The exploitation of which Bel th warned can occur in any number of ways.
177. According to Iain Ramsay, "the growth of the pejorative connotation of the
term 'paternalism' is relatively recent." RAMSAY, supra note 33, at 55.
178. Id. (quoting H.L.A. Hart).
179. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A
Monopsony Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CAL. L. REV. 13, 14 (1992) ("Laissezfaire policies that leave monopoly or oligopoly power unchecked in private hands
might allow industry members to raise their prices above the competitive level."). But
see MILTON FRIEDMAN & RoSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
222 (1980) (stating that "market competition, when it is permitted to work, protects
the consumer better than do the alternative government mechanisms that have been
increasingly superimposed on the market").
180. RAMSAY, supra note 33, at 40.
181. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
183. Joseph A. Bel th, A System for the Exploitation of the Terminally Ill, 16 INS.
F. 11, 12 (1989) (relating conversation with James A. Neidhart, M.D., director,
University of New Mexico Cancer Center).
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The inequality of bargaining power inherent in viatical settlements is a particularly powerful source of exploitation. A PWA
looking to sell his policy is approaching death and is often
financially desperate. The ravages of AIDS may have required
him to quit his job, resulting in loss of income and employerprovided health coverage. Expensive medications may have
drained his bank account. 184 As a result, he may willingly
accept an offer that would be unreasonable by an objective
standard. Across the table from him sits a viatical company
possessing detailed information about his health. By one
estimate, each policy buyer has five policies from which to
choose for every one it can buy, 185 so viatical companies can be
quite selective about which policies, and which PWAs, they
select.
Consider a hypothetical viatical settlement in which a PWA
seeks cash for his $100,000 life insurance policy. Assume that
the policy has a cash surrender value of $1500 at the time it
is viaticated. Given a choice between viaticating or not viaticating his policy, the PWA may systematically underestimate
its value. To the PWA in this position, any payment he receives
above the cash value of the policy is a windfall, since that
payment is unavailable to him during his lifetime without a
viatical settlement. An offer of $55,000 may appeal to this
PWA because it is $53,500 more than he could receive from the
cash value of the policy. But an offer of$55,000 is unfair in the
sense that it is $45,000 less than the value of the policy to the
viatical company or to the PWA's prior beneficiaries. Thus, to
the extent that the PWA can perceive the benefits ofviaticating
his policy as a windfall and the costs of viaticating his policy
as falling on his prior beneficiaries, the PWA may be vulnerable to overreaching.
The undervaluing of policies which can occur in viatical
settlements results from the fact that viatical settlements
redefine how people should think about their life insurance. To
most people, life insurance is an asset which they purchase for
the benefit of others, not themselves. They have had no
occasion to think of it as an asset that is available for their
own use, other than at its cash surrender value. As one insurance company executive noted of the advent of accelerated
benefits, "'Up until now, life insurance has been really death

184. See Dean, supra note 1, at 124-25 (discussing the cost of AIDS medications).
185. Zicklin, supra note 110, at 17.
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insurance.' "186 The .same could be said of viatical settlements.
By making life insurance an asset available to the policyholder,
viatical settlements require policyholders to adjust their
attitudes toward their life insurance.
Policyholders must stop thinking of life insurance solely as
later benefiting their spouse or partner, children, or other loved
ones and start thinking of it as an asset that they can use for
their own benefit during their lives. Until life insurance is
widely recognized as an asset accessible to the living policyholder, people may not value it sufficiently. The insured's
discovery that he can get substantial sums of money from his
own life insurance policy may be a pleasant surprise. By
setting a floor below which the viatical payout cannot fall,
minimum payout regulations prevent viatical providers from
taking advantage of that pleasant surprise. Efforts to make
people aware of the value of their life insurance to them by
informing them of the possibilities of viatical settlement and
accelerated benefits should be encouraged along with any
system of minimum price regulation.
The incentive to obtain the maximum payout may vary with
the PWA's intended use of the money, as well as with his life
expectancy. For example, a PWA with only two years to live
need not be overly concerned that the money he receives for his
policy will last three years or four years, as long as it suffices
for two years. In addition, many PWAs viaticate not to pay
medical bills or housing costs but to take deservedly extravagant vacations or to buy exotic cars. 187 A PWA who wants to
take a trip to Europe may not care whether he receives enough
money to fly first-class instead of coach, but a PWA who needs
to finance his supply of zidovudine (AZT) likely will care
whether he receives enough to finance another three months'
supply of the expensive medication. Much more is at stake in
the latter case. In ~ddition, because the company will offer to
pay the viator less for his policy as his calculated life expectancy increases, 188 a viator may not want to bet against himself
by seeking out a company that determines he has fewer
months to live, even if it means that he will receive a higher
payout. Receiving a low payout is in this sense good news, for

186. Armstrong, supra note 84, at 39 {quoting Prudential Insurance Company of
America executive, Jim Longo).
.
187. LIFE BENEFACTORS, L.P., VIATICUM {promotional video tape) {on file with the
Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
188. See supra Part 11.B.l.
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it means that the company's physicians have determined the
viator's life expectancy to be relatively long.
None of this concern with undervaluation, and the overreaching that it allows, means that all or even most PWAs are
desperate, irrational, and incapable of driving a hard bargain
for their policies. There is a good deal of truth in the National
Viatical Association's statement that "[t]erminally ill persons
are just that, terminally ill; they are not incompetent." 189 But
protecting PWAs from overreaching does not deem them inherently incompetent: it only recognizes that they are often in
circumstances which make their exploitation more possible.
Minimum price regulation would make that overreaching
impossible.
·

Ill. THE ACCELERATED BENEFITS OPTION

The limits of viatical settlements in providing money to
PWAs and other viators have resulted in a new life insurance
.product that purports to make viatical settlements· obsolete.
The insurance industry and many commentators have trumpeted these "accelerated benefits" provisions in life insurance
policies as the solution to the money problems of the financially
strapped terminally ill, and the white knight to save the PWAs
from the supposed exploitation and greed ofviatical settlement
companies. 190 Although accelerated benefits are preferable to
viatical settlements in most circumstances, they are not, for
reasons to be explored in this Part, a total replacement for
viatical settlements.
Accelerated benefits are life insurance policy proceeds paid
by the life insurance company to the policyholder before the
policyholder dies. 191 For accelerated benefits to be available to
the policyholder, his policy either must already have an accelerated benefits option written into it, or his insurer must

189. NVA INFORMATION BOOKLET, supra note 32, at 13.
190. See, e.g., Nick Ravo, Companies That Buy Life Policies Under Scrutiny, CHI.
TRIB., July 1, 1994, at C3 (quoting a New York financial planner as stating that
"accelerated benefits from insurers [are] 'almost always' a better deal than payouts
from viaticals").
191. CRAWFORD, supra note 68, at 184.
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make the option available through a rider. 192 Most accelerated
benefits provisions allow the policyholder to accelerate benefits
under a number of different conditions, the most common of
which is the "diagnosis of a terminal illness for which death is
likely to occur within a specified number of months." 193 AIDS
is obviously one such condition. .
First introduced in the late 1980s, accelerated benefits since
have exploded in availability. Although only 215 of 446 companies surveyed by the American Council of Life Insurance and
LIMRA International offered accelerated benefits in 1994, those
215 companies included most of the largest companies, holding
approximately seventy percent of life insurance in force in the
United States. 194 Over eighteen million people were covered by
policies with accelerated benefits provisions in 1994, and that
number is considered to be a substantial undercount. 195
The chief advantage of accelerated benefits is that, unlike
viatical settlements, they cost the policyholder very little
money. In fact, thirty-two percent of companies offering accelerated benefits in group policies do not charge the policyholder
anything to accelerate. 196 Other group policy companies either
charge the policyholder an additional premium (12%), take the
fee out of the accelerated benefit paid to the policyholder (20%),
or treat the payout as a lien and charge interest on the amount
accelerated (20%). 197 For policyholders with individual policies,
fewer companies charge nothing (25%), and more companies
have adopted the additional premium (25%), discounted benefit
(25%), or lien (23%) approaches. 198 Even when the insurer
charges the policyholder for accelerating benefits, however, the
192. ACCELERATED BENEFITS UPDATE, supra note 174, at 7. In 1994, 84% of
accelerated benefits were offered through riders that can be added to existing policies,
while only 11 % were built into the policies themselves. Id. at 7 & tbl. 5.
193. Id. at 3. Eighty-three percent of accelerated benefits "products" can be activated for terminal illness, 12% for a "dread disease," 11% when a need for long-term
care arises, and 10% for conditions which result in a need for permanent home
confinement (total exceeds 100% because some products can be activated by more than
one condition). Id. at 5 & tbl. 2. AIDS, at least in its latter stages, could satisfy all
of these conditions.
194. Id. at 4-5.
195. Id. at 15 & fig. 3. The undercount resulted from the fact that many of the
companies offering accelerated death benefits could not provide information as to the
number of policyholders covered by accelerated benefits provisions. Id. Note that those
18 million people own only .5% of all life insurance policies in force. Quint, supra note
11, at Dl.
196. ACCELERATED BENEFITS UPDATE, supra note 174, at 13 & tbl. 17.
197. Id.
198. Id. ·at 8-9 & tbl. 8.
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charge is insignificant when compared to the cost of viatical
settlement. The Prudential Insurance Company, for example,
deducts approximately four percent as its charge for acceleration, allowing a policyholder with a $100,000 policy to retain
$96,000 for himself and his beneficiaries. 199
Obviously, a world in which all terminally ill people had life
insurance with the option to accelerate benefits for no charge
would be a great improvement over the current state of affairs.
The limited availability of accelerated benefits, and limitations
on exercising the acceleration option when it is available,
however, leave intact the market for viatical settlements. Even
if a PWA owns a policy with an acceleration option, strict life
expectancy and amount limitations may make the option
unavailable or financially unattractive.
For example, sixty-seven percent of companies offering
accelerated benefits require that the policyholder have a life
expectancy of less than one year in order to accelerate benefits. 200 Thirty percent allow acceleration only by policyholders
with life expectancies of less than six months. 201 This means
that even PWAs who own policies with accelerated benefit
provisions must sometimes wait for months, while their health
deteriorates and their bills pile up, to exercise the option. In
contrast, almost all viatical settlement companies accept
policies of PWAs with life expectancies of up to two years, with
some companies accepting those with life expectancies up to
three years. 202
In addition to these time limitations, most insurance companies offering accelerated benefit options restrict the percentage of the policy's face value which can be accelerated.
Fifty-nine percent of companies offering acceleration limit the
accelerated portion to no more than fifty percent of the policy's
face value. 203 Only twenty-five percent of companies impose no
limit on the percentage of face value which can be accelerated,
and only thirteen percent allow more than fifty percent (but
less than 100%) of face value to be accelerated. 204

199. Ian Brodie, Delicate Issue Blooms into $300m a Year Industry, THE TIMES
(London), July 19, 1994, at Business.
200. ACCELERATED BENEFITS UPDATE, supra note 174, at 6 & tbl. 4.
201. Id.
202. See supra note 112.
203. ACCELERATED BENEFITS UPDATE, supra note 174, at 9 & tbl. 9.
204. Id.
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One significant advantage of accelerated benefits over viatical settlements is that the unaccelerated remainder of the
policy, less any fee, goes to the policyholder's named beneficiaries upon his death. 205 But that remainder to the
beneficiaries is not always an advantage, especially if the
policyholder's financial needs exceed the amount which the
insurer allows him to accelerate. For example, if only twentyfive percent of face value is available through acceleration, that
amount will be substantially less than the amount offered by
even a low viatical settlement in a market without minimum
price regulation, notwithstanding the fact that under an
acceleration option, most if not all of the remaining seventyfive percent will go to the policyholder's beneficiaries upon his
death. To a PWA strapped for cash and without children for
whom to provide a death benefit, the amount offered by a
viatical company may be more attractive than that offered by
the acceleration option.
For many PWAs, however, acceleration will provide, at low
or no cost, ample cash for their needs, while leaving intact a
payout to their beneficiaries. Where both viatication and
acceleration are available options, and where the terminally-ill
person's policy allows him to accelerate a sum sufficient to
meet his needs, accelerated benefits are superior to viatical
settlements.
Because accelerated benefits are a new product, however, few
people know of their availability. All state viatical settlement
acts and the NAIC's Model Act therefore require that viatical
settlement companies inform prospective viators of the possibility of accelerated benefits. 206 This requirement seeks to avoid
a major source of inefficiency in the viaticals market by preventing viators from accepting viatical settlements when
acceleration would have provided them with more cash.
Accelerated benefits, while in many ways preferable to
viatical settlements, are only preferable under quite narrow
conditions: the policyholder must have purchased life insurance
from a company that provides the option of acceleration, he
must have less than one year to live, and his financial needs
must be satisfiable by whatever fraction of his policy's face
value acceleration will provide. If those conditions are met,
205. See CRAWFORD, supra note 68, at 184 (explaining'that an accelerated benefits
provision may allow payout of part of the death benefit and that the face amount and
cash value of the policy will be reduced accordingly).
206. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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acceleration is vastly superior to viatical settlement. If one of
those conditions is absent, however, a viatical settlement might
be a more. attractive option.

CONCLUSION

Rather than a "ghoulish" practice that ought to be banned
outright, viatical settlements can be a freeing and empowering
option for PWAs and other terminally ill people. At present,
however, that freedom can come at too high a price. Licensing
requirements help to ensure high standards for viatical companies in a business which by its nature requires the highest
ethical standards; Disclosure regulations help to ensure that
PWAs are aware of accelerated benefit options and know the
financial downsides of viatication. Minimum.payout regulations
will ensure that viators receive fair payouts for their policies,
while still allowing viatical investors a reasonable return
commensurate with the actual risks and costs of the viatical
business.

